The Second Marquetalia is an armed group that emerged after the Havana Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).
Led by well-known former guerrilla commander Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez,” a handful of FARC members abandoned the reintegration process and returned to armed conflict, citing the “government’s betrayal of the peace agreements.”
Despite suffering several internal fractures and losing multiple commanders, the organization continues to operate in various parts of Colombia, especially along the border with Venezuela. In Venezuela, the group reportedly operates with tacit government approval.
Following President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 election, the Second Marquetalia expressed interest in participating in the Total Peace process, Petro’s flagship security policy aimed at engaging illegal armed groups in dialogue. In mid-2024, the Second Marquetalia began negotiations with the government, but there has been little progress.
History
On August 29, 2019, Iván Márquez announced that a group of ex-combatants were defecting from the peace process, taking up arms again, and creating the Second Marquetalia. In a YouTube video filmed somewhere along the Colombia-Venezuela border, Márquez cited the “betrayal of the state to the peace agreements” as the group’s motive. Márquez described the event as the return of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC – EP), the oldest guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere.
Flanking Márquez were other former FARC commanders, including Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” Seuxis Pausías Hernández, known as “Jesús Santrich,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña.”
The announcement came several months after the disappearance of ex-combatants who had been part of the Havana peace negotiations and who later demobilized.
On May 18, 2021, Jesús Santrich, one of the most prominent figures in the Second Marquetalia, reportedly died during a confrontation in Venezuela. Later, two other high-ranking leaders, El Paisa and Romaña, were killed in Venezuela, presumably in clashes with the FARC’s 10th Front, another FARC dissident faction that also abandoned the peace process.
Trying to avoid a similar fate, Márquez seemingly went into hiding in December 2021. He was not heard from again until July 2022, when rumors spread that he had been killed in an operation in Venezuela.
When Gustavo Petro took office in 2022, the Second Marquetalia expressed interest in participating in his government’s Total Peace talks. In October 2022, the Colombian government sent a delegation to Venezuela to begin talks with the Second Marquetalia.
Since then, the Second Marquetalia and Colombian government have held private meetings, and the group has publicly expressed its willingness to negotiate. However, progress toward public negotiations or a ceasefire has stalled. Internal divisions within the group, along with the Colombian government’s refusal to lift Iván Márquez’s arrest warrant and requests for information about his whereabouts, which remains unknown, have further complicated negotiations.
Iván Márquez was injured in an attack in 2022 and reported dead in 2023. However, in 2024, he surfaced at a public event. That November, a letter, presumably signed by Márquez, announced that two of the group’s most important factions, the Border Command and the Guerrilla Coordinator of the Pacific, were breaking away to continue talks with the Colombian government independently. These splintered factions formed a new group called the National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army, led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza,” and Giovanny Andrés Rojas, alias “Araña.” The other faction led by Márquez and Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40,” adopted the name New Bolivarian Army.
The Second Marquetalia has been significantly weakened in recent years by internal fractures and clashes with other armed groups. Moreover, Márquez’s absence from peace talks has raised doubts about the group’s survival. However, the organization still has a significant presence on the Colombia-Venezuela border.
Criminal Activity
The Second Marquetalia has maintained a strong presence along the Colombia-Venezuela border, particularly in the departments of Vichada and Guainía in Colombia, and the Venezuelan states of Amazonas and Bolívar. There, the Acacio Medina Front, led by Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40,” controls key areas for mineral exploitation and the cocaine trade between the two countries.
The group has attempted to consolidate its influence in the departments of Valle del Cauca and Meta. Authorities in those departments have identified the Second Marquetalia as one of the main perpetrators of extortion, which the group has often used to strengthen its territorial control.
The Second Marquetalia has also consolidated its involvement in illegal coltan mining in the eastern region of Orinoquía and gold mining in the southern department of Nariño. Although it has tried to extend its influence in other parts of both countries, it has not managed to reclaim much of the criminal territory once controlled by the FARC.
Leadership
The main leader of the Second Marquetalia is Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez,” who was a member of the FARC Secretariat and second-in-command at the time of the group’s demobilization. He has been the Second Marquetalia’s spokesperson and key decision-maker since the group was formed, but it remains unclear whether he is still alive.
The group’s second-in-command, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” was killed in August 2025 in an ambush by the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) along the Colombia-Venezuela border. The Colombian government confirmed Zarco’s death shortly after, attributing it to a drug-trafficking dispute between the two guerrilla groups.
Possible replacements for Zarco include alias “Gonzalo,” commander of the 41st Front, or alias “Chicharrón,” leader of the Teófilo Forero structure in the department of Caquetá, who inherited criminal earnings once controlled by El Paisa in southwestern Colombia.
Allies and Enemies
The Second Marquetalia initially formed an alliance with the ELN’s Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO) to control illegal mineral mining in the departments of Guainía, Vichada, and Meta. The groups also agreed to coordinate against the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), a federation of dissident FARC fronts with a significant presence in Colombia.
However, after the presumed assassination of Zarco Aldinever, this alliance is believed to have broken down.
Days before the release of the communiqué about Zarco’s death, fighting occurred in a municipality in Amazonas, Venezuela, indicating a rupture between the two organizations and the ELN’s final push to take control of the southern border.
The Second Marquetalia has also suffered internal fractures: on the one hand, with the Border Command, and on the other with the Guerrilla Coordinator of the Pacific. The split with the Border Command could lead to a significant loss of illicit earnings from drug trafficking, as this group has ties to criminal organizations in Ecuador that supply cocaine.
Geography
The Second Marquetalia’s broken alliances with the Border Command and the Guerrilla Coordinator of the Pacific have reduced its territorial reach. The group currently has a presence in the departments of Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Huila, Meta, Santander, Vichada, and Guainía.
The group’s armed stronghold is located along the Colombia-Venezuela border, primarily in the departments of Vichada and Guainía and the Venezuelan states of Amazonas, Bolívar, and Apure. There, the group dominates key areas for the cocaine trade between both countries and mineral exploitation.
Prospects
The Second Marquetalia’s military strength has diminished as a result of clashes with the FARC Mafia’s 10th Front and the ELN along the Colombia-Venezuela border. This has made negotiations with the Colombian government seem the only viable solution to an unwinnable war. However, internal divisions have complicated negotiations, leaving only the National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army in talks with the government. This poses a challenge for the Second Marquetalia, whose leaders are unlikely to have another opportunity to negotiate after Petro’s administration ends.
The internal split, and resulting reduced military capacity, also hamper the Second Marquetalia’s ability to maintain control over its drug trafficking and illegal mining operations. Losing the ELN as its most important criminal ally in Venezuela is another setback, weakening both the group’s future criminal operations and the presence of its commanders across the border.
