The elements of the military believed to be most deeply involved in Venezuela’s drug trade are, unsurprisingly, concentrated along the western border with Colombia, especially the states of Apure, Zulia, and Tachira. The power of these cells comes from their access to Venezuela’s major airports, road checkpoints, and ports, including Puerto Cabello in Carabobo state. These military organizations are thought to source some of their cocaine from Colombian guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), particularly the Eastern and Magdalena Medio Blocs.
The term “Cartel of the Suns” was reportedly first used in 1993 when two National Guard generals, anti-drugs chief Ramon Guillen Davila and his successor Orlando Hernandez Villegas, were investigated for drug trafficking and other related crimes. As brigade commanders, each wore a single sun as insignia on their shoulders, giving rise to the name “Cartel of the Sun” (later on, when allegations emerged that division commanders -- given double suns in their ranking -- were involved in the drug trade, the term became the “Cartel of the Suns”).
In the 1990s, accusations emerged of National Guard troops collaborating with drug traffickers, but, generally speaking, this mainly consisted of accepting payments to look the other way while traffickers moved their wares. The military did not have direct connections with suppliers, and for the most part they did not move or store cocaine themselves.
Three significant developments then contributed to the rise of organized crime in Venezuela. In the first place, Colombia signed the multi-billion dollar security program Plan Colombia with the United States, which allowed Colombian security forces to pressure guerrilla groups the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) as never before. This military pressure encouraged the guerrillas to shift more of their operations to Venezuela’s poorly policed border states.
Then in 2002 there were two key events, one after the other. The first was the ending of the peace process between the FARC and the government of President Andres Pastrana, which meant the rebels lost their huge safe haven in southern Colombia, and needed other refuges. The second was the attempted coup d’etat that saw President Hugo Chavez temporarily removed from power. This led the Chavez to focus much of his energy on identifying and penalizing coup supporters, while dealing with other intense political battles such as the 2002-2003 oil strike.
The fallout from the coup led the Chavez administration to tighten its circle of trusted supporters; it also meant that many influential government positions or lucrative contract opportunities were given to army loyalists. The government took on the feel of a Praetorian regime, with serving or retired military officers taking up positions in state institutions.
Chavez also set up military areas of operations along the border with Venezuela, citing fears of a US invasion via Colombia. Elements of the army as well as the National Guard became corrupted by the drug trade.
The term “Cartel of the Suns” was brought back to public attention by journalist and municipal councilman Mauro Marcano in 2004. He accused National Guard brigade commander and Director of Intelligence Alexis Maneiro, and other National Guard members, of links to drug traffickers, before being gunned down. The Marcano affair suggested more systematic corruption in the National Guard, yet the government only made a half-hearted effort to investigate. No investigation was opened against Maneiro, and he was transferred to a less visible position.
Around this time, there were other signs that drug trafficking was increasing inside Venezuela. 2004 saw record narcotics seizures inside the country: 32 tons of cocaine and 12 tons of heroin and marijuana. The military’s involvement in facilitating the movement of cocaine also came under scrutiny in August 2004, when several guardsmen framed three airline passengers (including a US citizen) for smuggling drugs through Caracas’ international airport. National Guard officials were also arrested in a separate case, caught loading cocaine into a private plane at Maiquetia airport (now the Simon Bolivar International Airport). Such incidents highlighted the military’s role in the drug trade, and their tendency to only seize drug shipments when they had not received the appropriate pay-offs.
In 2005 there was another development that contributed to the strengthening of organized crime networks inside the country, when Chavez accused the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of espionage. This brought US-backed counter-narcotics projects to a halt, including one initiative which would have updated screening technology in the port Puerto Cabello, one of the country’s most important exit points for drug shipments.
One of the clearest indications that officials at the top level of the security forces were deeply involved in organized crime came in 2008 when the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against the following individuals:
- Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, at the time the director of military intelligence.
- Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, whom Chavez named general-in-chief and then defense minister in January 2012.
- Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, former Minister of Interior and Justice.
All supposedly served as contacts for the FARC in a drugs-for-weapons scheme.
In September 2011, the OFAC sanctioned another four Venezuelan officials, reportedly based on evidence retrieved from the laptops found at the encampment of slain FARC commander Raul Reyes:
- Cliver Antonio Alcala Cordones, later appointed as head of the army's Guiana Integral Strategic Defense Region (REDI Guayana)
- Congressman Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, a former Caracas mayor
- Intelligence officer Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno
- Amilcar Jesus Figueroa Salazar, a politician described as “a primary arms dealer for the FARC, and ... a main conduit for FARC leaders based in Venezuela.”
Supporters of the Chavez administration argued that the OFAC list is based on unsubstantiated evidence from the FARC laptops, and that there exists no concrete evidence of this “Cartel of the Suns” actually carrying out criminal operations. Others have criticized the OFAC list as a political tool used to smear the Chavez regime.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the security forces did not carry out fully transparent investigations into the alleged misconduct of Maneiro, Alcala, and others when they had the chance. Other incidents -- such as the “narcoavioneta” case of 2011 -- also fed the impression that there was complicity with organized crime at the very highest levels of the government and military. A small aircraft captured in the northern state of Falcon, carrying some 1,400 kilos of cocaine, was discovered to have taken off from La Carlota military base in Caracas in August 2011. Spokespeople for the military, air force, and government issued different explainations for what had taken place.
Another case that began in September 2013, this time involving a commercial airliner, led to the arrest of 28 people, among them a lieutenant coronel and other National Guard members. On September 10, an Air France plane landed in Paris with 1.3 tons of cocaine on board, packed into 31 suitcases. The plane had taken off from the Maiquetia airport in Caracas, which is closely controlled by the National Guard. It was immediately clear that there was extensive collaboration by members of the military.
Though a string of National Guard arrests were made in connection with the case, all were low-ranking officers. No senior officers were held accountable, despite the fact, as stated by a Venezuelan investigative journalist, "It was impossible, unthinkable, that this was not carried out without cooperation at the very highest levels." A parliamentary commission was set up to investigate, but the members lacked independence from the Executive, increasing the likelihood they would cast blame outside the National Guard.
Throughout the history of the Cartel of the Suns there has been very little investigation into professional misconduct, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the integrity of the armed forces has been severely compromised by organized crime.
During the mid-2000s elements of the National Guard and other branches of the military became much more active participants in the drug trade. Cells in the security forces began to purchase, store, move, and sell cocaine themselves, whereas previously their primary role had been to extort drug traffickers moving cocaine shipments. One theory for why this evolution took place is because Colombian drug smugglers began paying the military in drugs rather than cash, forcing the Venezuelans to find their own markets for the narcotics.
There is no family tree for a structure as nebulous as the Cartel of the Suns, only a list of names published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and plenty of speculation. It seems evident that the primary branches of the armed forces -- the National Guard, the army, the navy, and the air force -- all have factions that traffic drugs. While they sometimes appear to work together, there is also evidence that they work against each other and steal drug shipments (a practice known as “tumbes”). There have been reports of a drug trafficking faction within the military made up of officers involved in the 1992 coup attempt, a group informally known as the “Cartel Bolivariano.”
Cocaine shipments are purchased in the Venezuelan border states of Apure and Zulia, or else in the Colombian border states. Because dollars are in short supply in Venezuela, and because the bolivar is frequently devalued in the black market, it is rare for the purchases to involve cash. Cocaine is often swapped for weapons, especially in deals with the FARC. Otherwise, the Venezuelans act as partners with the Colombian-based traffickers, agreeing to split the profits from the sale of the cocaine overseas.
The most popular trafficking routes are by air to the Dominican Republic and Honduras. Another route is to move the cocaine by land to Suriname, then by air or boat to West Africa and onwards to Europe. When moved by land, the cocaine is usually stored in local ranches and farms owned by civilian contacts.
The National Guard worked with civilian drug trafficker Walid Makled in order to move their drug shipments out of Venezuela. Makled has also claimed to have worked with dozens of top level military officials. But while it appears that the National Guard and the army both used Makled as their “broker” to organize the movement of cocaine shipments outside the country, there is no love lost between these two factions of the security forces. The two have fought, stealing cocaine shipments from one another and then reporting them as seizures. But it is rare that the reported cocaine seizures are totally destroyed -- usually they are skimmed off, then trafficked once again.
After Makled’s arrest in Colombia in 2010 and extradition back to Venezuela in 2011, it seems as though corrupt elements in the military have more or less successfully co-opted his trafficking networks in Zulia state. The National Guard cartel, meanwhile, is strongest in other Western parts of Venezuela, including along the Colombian departments of Arauca and Northern Santander.
“Drugs Linked to Venezuelan Armed Forces,” Steven Dudley and Phil Gunson, Miami Herald, July 4, 2005.
"Mitos y Realidades sobre el Cartel de los Soles" Javier Ignacio Mayorca, July 2012.
"Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC," US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designations, December 9, 2008.